Are theism and atheism totally opposed? Can they learn from each other? by Carter, J. Adam
 
 
 
 
 
Carter, J. A.  (2017) Are theism and atheism totally opposed? Can they 
learn from each other? In: Harris, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Philosophy, 
Science and Religion for Everyone. Routledge: New York, pp. 82-92. ISBN 
9781138234215 
 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/137831/ 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 06 March 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
 
  
 
 
 
 
For Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone, (eds.) M. Harris & D. H. Pritchard, (Routledge, 
forthcoming). 
 
 
 
 
 
ARE THEISM AND ATHEISM TOTALLY OPPOSED? CAN THEY LEARN FROM 
EACH OTHER? 
 
 
J. Adam Carter 
University of Glasgow 
adam.carter@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One very natural dividing line that—for better or worse—is often used to distinguish those who 
(put roughly for now) believe in God from those who do not is that between theism and 
atheism, where ‘theism’ is used to mark the believers and ‘atheism’ the non-believers. Such 
contrastive labels can serve many practical functions (e.g., signifying social identity) even when the 
terms in question are not clearly defined. Individuals are often, on the basis of their beliefs and 
values, attracted (sometimes rationally, sometimes irrationally) toward one such label more so 
than the other. However, once a clear statement of the substantive difference between theism 
and atheism is requested, things become more complicated, much more so than our casual use of 
these terms would suggest.  
 What exactly is the best way to capture the relationship between theism and atheism? To 
what extent are they opposed to one another, and relatedly, to what extent should they be 
regarded as exhausting the available theoretical options? §2 will canvass a range of responses to 
this cluster of questions. In §3, we explore the social-epistemic dimension of the 
atheism/theism divide, by focusing in particular on the issue of religious disagreements, 
including those disagreements that take very different assumptions as starting points.  
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2. THEISM AND ATHEISM 
 
The 20th century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1888-1951) was sceptical that any 
sharp definition (e.g., in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) of either theism (or by 
extension atheism, the denial of theism) could be fruitfully drawn. The term ‘theism’, which 
originates from the Greek term theos [θεός] meaning ‘god’, has historically been used to pick out 
a wide range of very different positions, all under the general description of ‘belief in God’, so 
many in fact that that we might wonder whether the term ‘theism’ (like the term ‘game’) is best 
understood as a kind of family resemblance term. Just as there is plausibly no set of conditions 
necessary and sufficient for counting as a game despite a cluster of properties shared by many but 
not all games, so likewise we might think there are no conditions necessary and sufficient for 
counting as ‘theism’ despite characteristic similarities between the views we use this term to pick 
out. Or so such a line of thinking would go.  
Relegating ‘theism’ (and by extension, atheism) to nothing sharper than a family 
resemblance term, however, might be premature. For one thing, even if there are various kinds 
of differing views that purport to accept ‘belief in God’ (understood minimally as a divine creator 
of the universe), self-described theists (unlike deists) typically posit further attributes. Whereas 
deists deny that God either interferes in the world or reveals himself in some detectable way, 
theists typically maintain both of these claims. Moreover, the term ‘theism’ can be sharpened 
further by associating additional properties with God, and in particular, the classic properties 
attributed to God by monotheistic religions (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam): an all-powerful, 
all-knowing, and infinitely good creator. 
Even if theism is used in this more specific sense, however, a further philosophical issue 
arises when it comes to defining atheism in terms of the denial of theism. For no matter how 
much we sharpen the notion of ‘God’ with reference to which theism is defined, the further 
characterisation of atheism as a denial of theism requires some further elaboration. For there are 
multiple ways one might deny theism, not all of which comport with our ordinary usage of 
‘atheism.’  
Atheism is typically associated with the kind of denial that is the rejection of the existence 
of God or other deities. Though one might also deny the existence of God in a weaker fashion, 
by refraining from believing in God while not outright maintaining God’s non-existence, a position 
typically associated with agnosticism. Let’s look at each of these positions in turn.  
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One method of support for atheism challenges the rationality of religious belief.  On this 
strategy, belief in God is, like any other kind of belief, the sort of thing that should be defensible 
via publicly available evidence that anyone, not just the believer herself, should be able to accept. 
Those who judge that the preponderance of such available evidence counts against the existence 
of God might then be atheists (i.e., they might reject the proposition that God exists) on such 
grounds. Interestingly, though, while some theists accept the evidentialist’s assumption that belief 
in God is rationally appraisable (and then argue further that the evidence actually supports God’s 
existence), not all do. According to fideism (e.g., Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855)), belief in God 
is better understood as a matter of faith, not a matter of evidence. Interestingly, this means that 
in response to the atheist who rejects the existence of God evidential grounds, the fideist can 
more or less agree with such an atheist interlocutor: that is, both the fideist and the atheist can 
agree that God’s existence cannot be evidentially established. Where the conflict lies in this case 
is the matter of whether God’s existence is rational or arational, not the matter of where in 
particular the evidence points (the point of contention between evidentialist theists and atheists).    
But what exactly, from the subject’s point of view, is involved in rejecting God’s existence? 
Must one have a certain level of confidence, or outright belief, in the nonexistence of God to 
qualify as an atheist by rejecting God’s existence, or might one simply possess some (perhaps 
strong) doubts? Such questions reveal that the line dividing atheism and agnosticism might not be 
so straightforward as a difference between on the one hand rejecting God’s existence and on the 
other refraining from believing in God’s existence.  
Here it will be helpful to consider the definition of agnosticism offered by William Rowe 
(1931–2015) as ‘the view that human reason is incapable of providing sufficient rational grounds 
to justify either the belief that God exists or the belief that God does not exist’. If one refrains 
from believing in God and does so because one thinks human reason is simply incapable of 
rationally arbitrating the matter, we might ask further: is this because human reason is in principle 
incapable of providing sufficient rational grounds one way or another, or rather, because one 
thinks human reason currently (i.e., situated within the current knowledge base available to us) is 
incapable of providing such evidence? We should note that there is scope for a further kind of 
agnostic: one who grants that there is no in principle limitation to human reason as such that 
precludes the possibility of rational belief for or against God’s existence, while maintaining that 
one self is nonetheless incapable. An agnostic of this variety refrains from believing in God but not 
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because human reason (a power common to all individuals) is limited, but because she (perhaps 
for reasons that apply just to her, her personal background, her own psychology, etc.) is 
incapable of locating sufficient reasons to warrant any sort of conviction one way or another. 
We’ve seen already that the theism/atheism distinction invites a range of more nuanced 
questions. One further such question concerns—at a greater level of generality than we’ve 
considered thus far—the psychology of theism, atheism and agnosticism in relation to the will, or 
the capacity of human volition. According to the 18th century Scottish enlightenment thinker 
David Hume (1711 – 1776) in A Treatise on Human Nature, the matter of what we believe, on any 
given matter, depends not on the will, ‘but must arise from certain determinate causes and 
principles, of which we are not masters’ (§ 624). This psychological and descriptive position about 
human belief, called doxastic involuntarism, has been given further expression by 20th century 
British ethicist Bernard Williams (1929 – 2003). According to Williams, if we could believe at will, 
and moreover if this is a power that is both common and not opaque to us, then it would be 
very hard to explain why we should ever be surprised when things turn out to be different than 
we believe. But we are invariably surprised in such cases, and so Williams thought we should 
reject that we possess the power to believe at will.  
If Hume and Williams are on the right track, then whether one is an atheist, theist or 
agnostic is not something over which she has direct control. And this point, if correct, has 
potentially important ethical implications. Consider, for example, the ‘ought implies can’ 
principle, often attributed to Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804). As Kant wrote in his 1793 book 
Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason: ‘For if the moral law commands that we ought to be 
better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better human 
beings.’ The crux of Kant’s insight here is that the very suggestion that we ought to do something 
implies that we should be at least capable of doing it. With reference to Kant’s principle, it looks 
very much as though Hume’s and Williams’ point about the non-voluntariness of believing would 
have an important implication—viz., that atheism/theism beliefs, no less than other beliefs, lie 
beyond the realm of duty, and thus that it would be a mistake to praise or for that matter blame 
individuals for holding such beliefs. To avoid this kind of conclusion (as will many who take belief 
in God to fall within the purview of praise and blame) it looks, initially at least, as though one 
must take issue with either Kant’s principle or with the descriptive claim that belief in God is 
non-voluntary in a way that (paired with Kant’s principle) implies this result.  
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In his famous essay ‘The Ethics of Belief’, W.K. Clifford (1845 –1879) goes the latter 
route. He thinks that there are various things we ought to believe (namely, for Clifford, all and 
only that which is supported by the evidence), and further that it is within our power to conform 
or to disregard this norm. The American pragmatist philosopher and psychologist William James 
(1842 – 1910) famously rejected Clifford’s ‘evidentialist’ norm of belief, though James (like many 
other pragmatist thinkers) is in firm agreement with the Clifford’s presumption (contra Hume and 
Williams) that we have enough control over our beliefs, including religious beliefs, that it makes 
sense to praise or blame us for them. If Clifford and James are (despite their differences) correct 
about this more basic point concerning the relationship between belief and the will, then theism 
and atheism can be viewed as a kind of choice, and thus, whatever separates theists and atheists 
is just a matter of what each chooses. 
  This is precisely the assumption that underwrote the French philosopher Blaise Pascal’s 
(1623–62) famous ‘gamble’ on behalf of the theist rather than the atheist position. Pascal’s 
Wager can be expressed the following idea: If one believes in the existence of God and God 
does exist, then one gains infinite reward, but if one loses this bet (and God doesn’t exist) one 
loses nothing. However, if one bets against the existence of God and is right, one wins nothing 
for one’s non-belief, though if one loses this bet, one receives an infinite loss. Thus, Pascal 
concluded, you should try to bring it about that you are a theist rather than an atheist.  
Whether Pascal’s Wager accurately characterises a decision problem we face turns 
(among other things) on the more fundamental question of whether theism and atheism are 
positions we can choose in any meaningful sense, an issue that as we’ve seen is contested by 
philosophers more generally at the level of belief in general.  
A final and important point about the theism/atheism divide concerns a separate dividing 
line, that between religion and science. It is not uncommon to encounter the following sort of 
fallacious reasoning: theism and atheism are fundamentally opposed; religion aligns with theism 
and atheism aligns with science; therefore, science and religion are fundamentally opposed.  
One problem with this sort of dichotomous thinking—one that we’ve already seen—is 
that the dividing line between theism and atheism isn’t one that can be drawn without quite a bit 
of terminological ground clearing and care, and even then, various open issues remain. But setting 
this aside, it is doubly problematic to derive conclusions about the religion/science distinction 
from premises about the atheism/theism distinction. Firstly, both theism and atheism have been 
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supported on the basis of scientific considerations as well as on the basis of theological or 
religious considerations. Secondly, regardless of what kinds of considerations have been appealed 
to support theism/atheism, the relationship between religion and science is fundamentally of a 
different kind than the relationship between theism/atheism. For theism and atheism are positions 
that can be believed or not, whereas religion and science are not ‘beliefs’ as such (even if there 
are various specific beliefs characteristic to each), but rather ways of coming to form beliefs—
viz., different epistemological methodologies. Thus, if the latter are in opposition, it will be 
because they are in opposition qua methodologies, not because (for instance) believing one 
excludes believing the other.  
  Nonetheless, methodologies can potentially clash for example by (i) 
mandating/forbidding incompatible methods; or by (ii) mandating/forbidding incompatible beliefs. 
As the philosopher Michael Murray (2017) has noted, there are three central views on the 
compatibility of religion and science: the inevitable conflict model, the non-conflict model, and the 
potential conflict model. The former insists that religion and science inevitably conflict with one 
another, given that religion and science offer genuinely alternative ways of coming to understand 
the world and our place in it, ways that issue various kinds of contradictions. At the level of 
methodology, for example, science forbids while at least some religions subscribe to divine 
revelation as a valid method; at the level of belief, Western science holds that the Earth is billions 
of years old, whereas some religions deny this. The non-conflict model by contrast denies that 
religion and science can even potentially conflict because religion and science concern 
nonoverlapping magisteria, or domains of authority. As American evolutionary biologist 
Stephen J. Gould (1941 – 2002), in defence of this position puts it, ‘The net of science covers the 
empirical universe: what is it made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The net of 
religion extends over questions of moral meaning and value. These two magisteria do not 
overlap’ (1997, §1). If Gould is right, then it is a mistake to think of science and religion as even in 
the market for conflict. 
A third position, the potential conflict model, maintains that religion and science can 
potentially conflict, e.g., as in the case where a religion advances verifiable empirical claims (e.g., 
the age of the earth). In response to potential conflicts, however, some thinkers, including the 
Italian polymath Galileo Galilei (1564 – 1642), have suggested that religion and science are at 
least potentially revisable with reference to the other (as opposed to mutually exclusive in light 
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of any potential incompatibilities observed). (For related discussion, see the chapter ‘Faith and 
Reason’, this volume). 
 
 
3. RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENT 
 
Is rational religious disagreement possible? Can theists and atheists expect to fruitfully engage with 
one another in dialogue, or are theists and atheists better off ‘agreeing to disagree’? Such 
questions have been pursued in recent work in social epistemology, and in this section, we’ll 
consider how some of these insights might help us to think more clearly about religious 
disagreements and their potential significance.  
 Firstly, for some ground clearing: we need to distinguish between the ethics and 
epistemology of disagreement. The question of what you should do when you find yourself in a 
religious disagreement with someone might be one sort of thing (e.g., concede, compliment your 
interlocutor’s impressive arguing skills, etc.,) from a point of view where ethical considerations 
are given priority, and a completely different sort of thing from a purely epistemic point of 
view—viz., roughly, the point of view where getting to the truth is what matters. Let’s hereafter 
restrict ourselves here to the following specifically epistemic gloss of the question: what is 
epistemically rational to do in the case of a religious disagreement? One lesson from social 
epistemology is that what rationality requires in the face of any sort of disagreement might vary 
considerably depending on what you already believe about the person with whom you are 
disagreeing.  
 Suppose we take ‘G’ to the proposition ‘God exists.’ You assert G, you interlocutor 
denies G. If your opponent if a child, or someone who you think hasn’t given due consideration 
to the question or perhaps lacks what you take to be information relevant to answering the 
question, you are not going to regard (prior to the disagreement) such an individual to be as 
likely as you are to be right on the matter. In such a case, the fact that such an individual 
disagrees with you might not be very rationally significant for whether you should continue to 
hold your belief.  
 Things become much more interesting, however, when we control for such differences. 
Suppose that, prior to finding out that your interlocutor disagrees with you on the matter of 
whether God exists, you regard your interlocutor to be an epistemic peer—viz., someone you 
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took to be just cognitively competent and well informed on the matter at issue as you are. What 
does rationality require of you now that you’ve found out this person disagrees with you? 
 There are two central positions on this matter. The conciliatory view says that, in a 
revealed peer disagreement, rationality requires that you adjust (to some degree) your 
confidence that the proposition at issue is true. Thus, if you discover that someone you think is 
as smart and as well informed on you in matters that are relevant to determining the existence of 
God disagrees with you about G, then according to the conciliatory view, it is rationally 
impermissible to remain just as confident as you were before on the matter of whether G is true. 
The steadfast view by contrast denies this claim and permits one to rationally ‘hold one’s 
grounds’ in the face of a revealed peer disagreement.  
 It’s a difficult and contentious matter in contemporary social epistemology which of these 
two positions is more plausible. And in the case of religious disagreement, things can get 
especially tricky. For example, the matter of determining who counts as an epistemic peer in the 
first place is relatively straightforward in the case of mundane, non-religious disagreements—say, 
about whether (say) a particular store is open on a Saturday. Anyone plausibly counts as your 
epistemic peer here provided they’ve been exposed to the same kind of evidence as you have 
and are in OK cognitive shape (i.e., not drunk, hallucinating). But in the religious case, it’s not so 
clear, as there often times will not already be agreement on what counts as the right kind of 
evidence that’s relevant to settling the dispute. For example, one who takes revealed scripture to 
be evidence relevant to the matter of whether God exists will perhaps not regard someone not 
acquainted with such scripture as equally likely to be right on the matter. To the extent that 
mutual recognition of epistemic peerhood seems more difficult to establish in the religious case 
than in more mundane cases where there is antecedent agreement on the matter of what kind of 
evidence is the relevant kind, the problem of accounting for the rational significance of religious 
disagreements becomes all the more philosophically challenging.  
 As philosopher John Pittard (2015) has suggested, one way to gain traction here is to 
distinguish between the first-order and higher-order epistemic significance of religious 
disagreements, by distinguishing more carefully between two kinds of evidence: first-order evidence 
which directly concerns the truth of some target proposition, p, and higher-order evidence vis-à-
vis p; higher-order evidence doesn’t bear directly on whether p but rather on the matter of 
whether one has rationally assessed the relevant first-order evidence. Thus, if the proposition 
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under discussion is The bank is open Saturday, then the testimony of the bank’s manager 
constitutes first-order evidence; if the bank manager also tells me that I’ve ingested a mind-
altering pill, then this new evidence has second-order significance. It doesn’t directly concern the 
matter of whether the bank is open, but it concerns my capacity to rationally assess the first-
order evidence I have.  
 With this distinction in mind, we can now briefly consider how the epistemic significance 
of religious disagreements might potentially differ (along the first- second- order dimension) 
across cases. For example, proponents of the conciliatory view will be inclined to suggest that, 
when we discover that someone we regard as an epistemic peer disagrees with us regarding the 
matter of whether God exists, this fact of such disagreement has a kind of second-order 
epistemic significance for us: it is not evidence that bears directly on the issue of whether God 
exists, but it bears (perhaps, as a kind of higher-order defeater) on our own ability to assess the 
first-order evidence.  
 By contrast, as Pittard notes, religious disagreement might also have a kind of first-order 
significance. Here, it will be helpful to briefly consider J.L. Schellenberg’s (1959 – ) problem of 
divine hiddenness, according to which God’s hiddenness motivates an argument for atheism. 
As Schellenberg sees it, a loving God would not make rational non-belief possible, given that God 
is all-just and non-belief carries with it culpability on some Christian accounts. But the ubiquity of 
apparently rational religious disagreement is evidence for the possibility of rational non-belief, and 
thus has first-order epistemic significance vis-à-vis the question of whether God exists.  
 Here is of course not the place to attempt to adjudicate the divine hiddenness argument. 
Rather, the example is meant to be illustrative of how, generally speaking, there are two 
interestingly different ways to think about the epistemic significance of religious disagreements, 
and that this is so regardless of whether one is already inclined toward the conciliatory or 
steadfast view.  
 As a final point, it will be worth bringing together a lesson from §2 with the material 
surveyed in §3. In §2 it was shown that the matter of the distinction between religion and science 
is best understood as a standalone philosophical problem, one that is not helpfully thought of as 
mapping on to the theist/atheist divide. With this point in mind, it will be useful to now consider 
that disagreements concerning theism and atheism do not themselves settle, and should be 
regarded as independent of, disagreements on the matter of whether religion or science 
  
10 
respectively offers a better method of engaging with the world and our place in it. That said, the 
more general structural points concerning the significance of disagreements bear importantly on 
the latter kind of dispute much as they do on the former.  In this respect, social epistemology 
offers important tools for thinking critically about both kinds of disputes.  
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
• The task of defining theism and atheism faces an initial difficulty given the variation in what 
people take ‘belief in God’ to refer to. This initial difficulty can be overcome to some 
extent by stipulating that God have certain properties, e.g., the properties typically 
assigned to God by classical monotheistic religions.  
• Atheism is typically associated with the kind of denial that is the rejection of the existence 
of God or other deities. Though one might also deny the existence of God in a weaker 
fashion, by refraining from believing in God while not outright maintaining God’s non-
existence, a position typically associated with agnosticism. 
• One method of support for atheism challenges the rationality of religious belief.  On this 
strategy, belief in God is, like any other kind of belief, the sort of thing that should be 
defensible via publicly available evidence that anyone, not just the believer herself, should 
be able to accept. This assumption that religious belief is rationally appraisable is denied 
by fideists, who regard religious belief to be arational. 
• If the ought-implies-can principle is correct, then theism/atheism are praiseworthy or 
blameworthy only if the matter of whether we believe in God is in some relevant sense 
voluntary. The more general issue of whether belief is subject to our direct control is 
what separates doxastic voluntarists (e.g., Clifford and James) and doxastic involuntarists 
(e.g., Hume and Williams). 
• It is problematic to attempt to deduce conclusions about the religion/science distinction 
from premises about the atheism/theism distinction. Firstly, both theism and atheism have 
been supported on the basis of scientific considerations as well as on the basis of 
theological or religious considerations. Secondly, theism and atheism are positions that 
can be believed or disbelieved, whereas religion and science are not ‘beliefs’ as such (even 
if there are various specific beliefs characteristic to each), but rather ways of coming to 
form beliefs—viz., different epistemological methodologies. 
• An epistemic peer, relative to is a given topic, is someone who is as cognitively competent 
and well informed on that topic as you are. According to the conciliatory view, rationality 
requires that you adjust (to some degree) your confidence about whether God exists 
upon finding that someone you regard as an epistemic peer on the topic of God’s 
existence disagrees with you. The steadfast view by contrast denies this claim and permits 
one to rationally ‘hold one’s grounds’ in the face of a revealed peer disagreement.  
• First-order evidence directly concerns the truth of some target proposition, p; higher-order 
evidence doesn’t bear directly on whether p is true but rather on the matter of whether 
one has rationally assessed the relevant first-order evidence. 
• Disagreements about theism/atheism, as well as disagreements about science and religion, 
can potentially be either first-order or second-order epistemically significant; however, it 
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is problematic to draw conclusions about the relationship between religion and science 
from facts about theism/atheism disagreements.  
 
 
STUDY QUESTIONS 
 
• Is the statement ‘All deists are theists’ true?  
• On what issue are fideists and evidentialists divided?  
• What is Rowe’s account of agnosticism, and can this account be unpacked in different 
ways, to get different versions of agnosticism? Discuss.  
• Does the theism/atheism distinction mark a difference in choice? What kind of answer 
would David Hume and Bernard Williams give to this question? What kind of answer 
would W.K. Clifford and William James give? Explain.   
• What does Kant’s ‘ought implies can’ principle have to do with the matter of whether 
theistic/atheistic belief is praiseworthy/blameworthy?  
• What is Pascal’s Wager? What is it intended to show? 
• Which model, if any, do you think best represents the relationship between religion and 
science: the inevitable conflict model, the non-conflict model, or the potential conflict model? 
Explain and defend your answer. 
• What is the difference between the conciliatory view and the steadfast view as regards 
the epistemology of disagreement? 
• What is it for a religious disagreement to be second-order epistemically significant as 
opposed to first-order epistemically significant?  
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GLOSSARY 
 
Agnosticism Agnosticism is typically defined in terms of a lack of belief (or some related 
 positive epistemic attitude) toward the existence of God or other deities. (Cf., atheism). 
Arational A belief or viewpoint is arational if it lies beyond the proper scope of rational 
 assessment; if  something is arational, it is neither rational nor irrational.  
Atheism Atheism is the denial of theism (see theism). 
Conciliatory view On the conciliatory view of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement, 
 rationality requires that you adjust (to some degree) your confidence about the target 
 proposition upon finding out that someone you regard as an epistemic peer on the matter 
 disagrees with you. 
Divine Hiddenness The divine hiddenness argument is an argument for atheism; the argument 
 represents a case where religious disagreements can have first-order epistemic 
 significance. 
Doxastic involuntarism Doxastic involuntarism is the view that our beliefs are not subject to 
 our direct control 
Epistemology Epistemology is a field of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of 
 knowledge and rationality, and related notions such as truth, understanding, wisdom, 
 and so on. 
Epistemic peer An epistemic peer, relative to whether some proposition p is true, is someone 
 who is  equally cognitive capable and well informed as you are with respect to the truth of 
 p. 
Fideism According to fideists, religious belief lies beyond the scope of rational assessment. 
First-order evidence First-order evidence directly concerns the truth of some target 
 proposition. 
Higher-order evidence Higher-order evidence doesn’t bear directly on whether some target 
 proposition p is true but rather on the matter of whether one has rationally assessed the 
 relevant first-order evidence (see first-order evidence). 
Monotheism The position that there is only one God; notable examples of monotheism include 
 Christianity, Judaism and Islam. 
Nonoverlapping magisteria Nonoverlapping magesteria are subject matters that are not in 
 principle in conflict with one another. 
Ought Implies Can Principle This philosophical principle, attributed to Immanuel Kant, says 
 (roughly) that if it’s true that we ought to do something then we must at least be capable 
 of doing it. 
Steadfast view The steadfast view is the denial of the conciliatory view (see conciliatory 
 view). 
Theism Theism is a philosophical position that is associated with belief in God. 
 
